United States v General Dynamics: A Reappraisal by Wylie, Anthony
University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of
Economics
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 8
2000
United States v General Dynamics: A Reappraisal
Anthony Wylie
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Economics Departments at Illinois Wesleyan University and Illinois State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics by the editors of the journal. For
more information, please contact sdaviska@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Wylie, Anthony (2000) "United States v General Dynamics: A Reappraisal," University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of
Economics: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol4/iss1/8
1 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
United States v General Dynamics: 
A Reappraisal 
 
 
Anthony Wylie 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
2 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Anthony Wylie 
02-01-00 
In 1959, General Dynamics acquired Material Services. Acquiring Material Services 
turned General Dynamics into the nation’s sixth largest coal producer and the largest 
producer in the Midwest. Such a status was made possible by Material Services’ two 
recent acquisitions, United Electric and Freeman Coal.  
In 1967, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an attack against General Dynamics. 
The foundation of the attack was that General Dynamics had, according to the DOJ, 
helped to further the concentration of the coal industry in both the Eastern Interior Coal 
Province1 (or the EICP) and the State of Illinois. The case was brought to the District 
Court that ruled ultimately in favor of General Dynamics. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, in 1974, a ruling was handed down that vindicated the actions of General 
Dynamics and dismissed the arguments proffered by the DOJ. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the reasons behind Material Services’ 
acquisitions, the reasons why the Government contested the mergers, and how the 
Government erred in analyzing the case. We wish to show that the combination of the 
three coal firms—Material Services, Freeman Coal, and United Electric—occurred for 
reasons of economic efficiency and practicality, not based on any atavistic desire to 
monopolize and damage social welfare.  
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This paper is divided into 7 sections. Section I shall provide a brief history of General 
Dynamics and of Material Services. Section II shall briefly discuss the DOJ’s merger 
guidelines. Section III will discuss the DOJ’s criticisms of Material Services’ acquisition 
of the two other coal companies, and will briefly discuss General Dynamics’ defense. 
Section IV will analyze the shortcomings of industry-concentration analysis. Section V 
will demonstrate how functional was applied to this case. Section VI will discuss the 
benefits of the acquisition of Freeman Coal and United Electric. Section VII will discuss 
the Court’s response to the DOJ’s arguments. The lasting impact of General Dynamics 
will also be considered.  
Section I. General Dynamics and Material Services. 
General Dynamics has been operating since the turn of the century. That firm has 
historically been a well-diversified, multi-product company. Aircraft, communications, 
and marine products have been the longest running product lines. The company’s largest 
purchaser is the Federal Government. More recently, the company has expanded into the 
telecommunications and computer software fields.  
 Material Services is considerably smaller than General Dynamics. The former is 
engaged in producing and supplying building materials. Material Services also operates 
coalfields in the Midwest region. In the 1950s and 1960s, the company undertook the 
acquisition of two companies engaged in the extraction of coal. Freeman Coal and United 
Electric were acquired, in part or in whole, by Material Services. Freeman Coal was 
engaged predominantly in underground mining, and United Electric operated many strip 
mines in Illinois. The benefits of these horizontal mergers are discussed in Section VI.  
 In 1959, General Dynamics acquired Material Services. Being two corporations 
having wholly different product lines, the acquisition of Material Services can be best 
described as conglomerate. General Dynamics’ purchase of Material Services was a part 
of a diversification program "aimed at expanding…into commercial, nondefense lines" 
(Posner 426). Seven years later, General Dynamics tendered an offer to purchase the 
outstanding shares of United Electric. The offer was successful and the acquisition of 
United Electric under General Dynamics had been made complete. In 1969, the DOJ 
contested General Dynamics’ acquisition of United Electric, a process which had begun 
under Material Services’ directorship, and turned General Dynamics into the largest coal-
producing firm in the Midwest.  
Section II. DOJ’s 1968 Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers. 
 The DOJ has adopted many guidelines over the decades to provide a framework 
for identifying those firms whose actions both violate the Sherman Act (and the 
amending Clayton and Cellar-Kefauver Acts), and, as a consequence, necessitate the 
response of the DOJ. The case against General Dynamics falls under the 1968 
Guidelines. This section shall provide a brief introduction to those guidelines.  
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 Horizontal mergers between firms may carry many benefits. The most obvious are 
the synergies that are generated by combining the production processes of two or more 
firms (Walters 218). As a result of a merger, costs may be minimized, greater resources 
may be allocated to research, and the levels of technical skills of both firms may be 
raised.  
 The benefits of such merger activity may be negated if the combination 
concentrates a market to such an extent that competition is lessened and consumer 
welfare declines. The DOJ’s criticisms of horizontal mergers in concentrating markets are 
that merged firms may not face the degree of competition as they had hitherto been 
subject. As a result of decreasing competition, the larger, postmerged firm may be 
disinclined to operate as efficiently. If firms are able to do so without a contrary response 
by their competitors, firms may cut output and raise prices. This would effectively erode 
consumer welfare. The DOJ also contests horizontal mergers between firms whose 
combination tends to increase market concentration.  
 The DOJ will contest mergers if they fall within certain parameters. For example, 
in markets where the shares of the four largest firms are equal or in excess of 75%, the 
merger will be contested (Thompson 184). A much more comprehensive look at the 
parameters for horizontal mergers is available in Thompson’s "Text, Cases, and Materials 
on Antitrust Fundamentals."  
 One aspect of the DOJ’s guidelines that will be touched on more broadly concerns 
the issue of synergies. According to Thompson, the DOJ will not refuse to challenge a 
merger merely on the grounds that such a combination produces synergies (185). The 
reasons for this are that synergies are difficult to measure, and also because the synergies 
that a combination can generate may be producible within the individual firm itself. This 
is of great importance because the combination of Freeman Coal and United Electric 
under Material Services generated numerous synergies, as will be mentioned in Section 
VI. 
 One of the key elements of General Dynamics was the use of functional analysis 
of the merging companies and the conditions of the industry the companies were engaged 
(Stelzer 170). According to Rogowsky, the Court considers the probable effects of the 
merger, the history of the industry, the structure of the market, the financial conditions of 
the companies involved, and, most importantly, the creation of any efficiencies (148). 
Rogowsky writes, "[t]he Guidelines have not been ignored by the judiciary, but they have 
certainly not been binding" (148). The use of functional analysis by the courts dispel 
immediately with the notion that the merging of two or more firms, whether or not they 
meet the criteria established by the DOJ, will be ruled per se illegal. In Brown Shoe, the 
Court maintained that: 
 "Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the  industry 
leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the  primary index of market 
power; but only a further examination of  the particular market—its structure, history, 
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and probable future— can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anti-
 competitive effect of the merger" (Kitt 266). 
It should be noted, however, that the use of functional analysis began with  
Brown Shoe, which predates General Dynamics. 
Section III. DOJ’s Criticisms of Material Service’s Acquisition of  Freeman 
Coal and United Electric, and the Insufficiency of  Concentration Ratios 
 The DOJ followed in the history of United States v. Aluminum Company of 
America (1964) by asserting that ‘"if concentration is already great, the importance of 
preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of 
eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great"’ (Moyer 19). The DOJ, thus, charged 
that the acquisition of United Electric, initiated by Material Services and finalized under 
General Dynamics, had further induced concentration in the coal industry in the Eastern 
Interior Coal Province (Stelzer 168). The DOJ demonstrated, in the relevant geographic 
market, the total number of coal companies had decreased. Also, coal had been shown to 
be a market, which lacked interfuel competition. In addition, the DOJ provided evidence 
that a small concentration of firms were taking a commanding lead in the production of 
coal. Table I illustrates this last point. 
Table I 
Concentration of the Coal Industry 
In the Eastern Interior Coal Province 
And Illinois  
  Eastern Coal Province Illinois 
  1957 1967 1957 1967 
Top 2 Firms 29.6 48.6 37.8 52.9 
Top 4 Firms 43.0 62.9 54.5 75.2 
Top 10 Firms 65.5 91.4 84.0 98.0 
Thompson, George. Text, Cases, and Materials on Antitrust Fundamentals. Pp. 182. 
The DOJ charged General Dynamics with encouraging the concentration of the coal 
industry in the Midwest. Even though General Dynamics had not been charged with any 
violation of conduct such as price discrimination or price gouging, the mere change in the 
structure of the industry sufficed to warrant prosecution.  
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Under attack by the DOJ, General Dynamics proffered several arguments to counter the 
DOJ’s claims. This section will summarize the defense of General Dynamics.  
First, General Dynamics maintained that United Electric’s coal reserves had been 
decreasing several years prior to the start of the case. The majority of United Electric’s 
reserves had already been committed to electric utilities under long-term contracts. The 
amount of reserves available for sale in the spot market amounted to 1% in the 
geographic market established by the DOJ. This caused United to be an inept competitor 
with diminishing ability to disrupt the market by undercutting price and quantity.  
Second, because United’s coal reserves were facing eventual exhaustion (the useful life 
of United’s reserves was estimated to last until 1991), General Dynamics maintained that 
the acquisition of United was legitimate and acceptable under the failing firm doctrine 
(Moyer 13). This argument would later be rejected by both the District and the Supreme 
Court, both of which took notice of the fact that United, despite diminishing reserves, 
was till "highly profitable" (Kitt 268).   
Third, General Dynamics maintained that the relevant product market had been too 
narrowly defined to the point that several energy substitutes had been excluded. This will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
We shall now examine how the courts viewed the charges of the DOJ against General 
Dynamics.  
Section IV. The Insufficiency of the DOJ’s Charges.  
At first glance, the concentration ratios proffered by the DOJ demonstrated that the 
market was severely concentrated. However, the use of concentration ratios cannot be 
applied to every industry and reflect a realistic image of an industry’s current state and 
structure. According to Richard Gordon, "When the market involves competition among 
somewhat different goods such as different types of fuels, coals, computers, or packaging 
materials, share measures cannot be used satisfactorily" (33). Concentration ratios rest on 
the assumptions that the relevant geographic market has properly been identified, that the 
relevant product market has properly been identified, and that a company’s total sales 
reflect that company’s market power. 
 We shall demonstrate that all three of the findings of the DOJ were inadequately 
reached. We shall provide both the findings of the District Court and the Supreme Court, 
as well as new evidence.  
 First, on the issue of the relevant geographic market, both courts agreed with the 
DOJ that the Eastern Interior Coal Province and the State of Illinois were the relevant 
markets for the sale of coal. This market had been named by the Geological Survey when 
mapping U.S. coal reserves (Stelzer 168). The market delineation was further 
strengthened by the fact that coal imported into the EICP was priced as much as 40% 
higher than coal produced within. However, according to Elizinga and Hogarty, "[p]rice 
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data generally are not going to be adequate to use in delineating geographic market 
boundaries" (7).  
A LIFO/LOFI test, conducted in 1978 by Elizinga and Hogarty, weakens the DOJ’s 
argument that the EICP was the relevant geographic market. To discover what was the 
relevant market, Elizinga and Hogarty took the aggregate coal used by each state, and set 
out to find the source of the coal. In their findings, almost 30% of all of the coal used in 
Illinois were imported from companies operating in the Rocky Mountain States, none of 
which are germane to the EICP. Also, Missouri imported 50% of that state’s coal from 
the western states. In addition, Kentucky imported 60.3% from the Appalachian 
coalfields (16). Clearly, the geographic scope of the coal market was larger than the 
EICP.  
We shall now consider the relevant product market. As has been mentioned, coal was 
increasingly being consumed by the electrical utilities, who were quickly becoming the 
largest consumers of coal in the nation. Other consumers included cement companies and 
railroads, both of which consumed infinitesimal amounts compared to the utilities 
(Stelzer 175).  
The DOJ maintained that coal was a market of energy unto itself (Kitt 272). This was 
because businesses that used coal in their production processes were not necessarily able 
to substitute to other fuels. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court disagreed 
vehemently with this view. On the issue of interbrand competition, the Supreme Court 
noted that the findings of Continental Can "compel this Court to conclude that since coal 
competes with gas, oil, uranium, and other forms of energy, the relevant line of 
commerce must encompass interfuel competition" (Stelzer 174, Slade 94). The effect of 
including other fuels into the relevant product market would decrease substantially the 
importance of concentration in the coal industry and the ratios that reflect it.  
We should amend this section by adding that electric firms relied upon a variety of fuels 
to generate electricity. Even though coal was increasingly becoming the mainstay of the 
electrical industry, it should be noted that higher prices in the coal market quickly met 
with raising price sensitivity (Moyer 11). According to Mann, "[t]here does exist long-
term factor substitution of coal for oil or natural gas" (Stelzer 35). The reverse was also 
true. 
The third assumption behind the use of concentration ratios is that they reflect the market 
power of a firm. The combination of Material Services, Freeman Coal, and United 
Electric created the largest coal producing entity in the EICP (Kitt 265). This was 
inferred from the sales that those three firms enjoyed. The DOJ, however, erred in its 
findings that the united firm (under the hegemony of General Dynamics) constituted a 
threat to consumers either in the EICP or in Illinois.  
Both Material Services and Freeman Coal enjoyed long-lasting reserves. United Electric, 
on the other hand, suffered from inadequate reserves. The majority of United’s coal was 
committed to fulfilling that company’s long-term contracts with Commonwealth Edison 
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and others. United’s uncommitted reserves (those that could be sold in the spot market) 
amounted to 1% of the unmined coal in the EICP. Long-term contracts constrained 
United from effectively competing for other such contracts until the existing ones expired 
(most of which expired in 1991). Statistics of production figures proffered by the DOJ 
could only imply that that company was successfully fulfilling the existing commitments 
of the firm. Such figures suggested very little about the competitiveness outside of 
United’s commitments.  
The DOJ, when litigation reached the Supreme Court, accepted that United was facing 
exhaustion of its coal reserves. However, the DOJ maintained that United, like many 
other firms, could, at any time, acquire the technology to uncover new reserves, thus 
increasing that firm’s total reserves. In court, General Dynamics successfully countered 
this attack by presenting many witnesses who testified that General Dynamics had 
financially assisted United in attempting to find new coal reserves on land owned by the 
latter. This demonstrated that United had no means of expanding its operations given its 
present amount of land.  
Despite the lack of success, assisting United Electric in uncovering new coal reserves was 
logical for two reasons. Firstly, existing legislation requiring coal firms to return land to 
its "natural state" would have been an expense whose occurrence could be delayed by 
uncovering new reserves. Secondly, after the passage of the Federal Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969 (mentioned below), labor pro-ductivity in underground mining 
operations fell greatly. Other reasons also made underground mining unattractive to the 
coal industry.2 For these reasons, General Dynamics was inclined to assist United Electric 
in finding new reserves. The Court ruled that United Electric might or might not procure 
additional reserves in the future. However, the mere possibility of this occurring was 
deemed irrelevant to the case by the courts (Stelzer 269).  
We shall now examine how functional analysis was applied to the case and how the 
courts reached its conclusion in favor of General Dynamics. This requires an intimate at 
both the coal industry and the companies involved in the acquisition.  
Section V. An industry in Consolidation.  
 The acquisition of United Electric and Freeman Coal was not an attempt on the 
part of Material Services to gain market power over the coal industry. To understand the 
reasons behind the acquisition and to assess the probable effects of the acquisition 
requires the use of functional analysis. Functional analysis differs from industry-
concentration analysis in that the latter does not consider the trends of the industry or of 
the economy. Functional analysis takes these elements into consideration. Therefore, we 
must examine the coal industry, not just the litigants.  
This section will attempt to explore some of the reasons why the coal industry was 
undergoing tremendous consolidation in the postwar era. The following table illustrates 
the concentration of the coal industry during the postwar years from 1950 to 1965. 
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Table II. 
National Coal Production Concentration Ratios 
Year 4-FIRM 8-FIRM 20-FIRM 
1950 13.6 19.4 30.4 
1955 17.8 25.5 39.6 
1960 21.4 30.5 44.5 
1965 26.6 36.3 50.1 
Chakravarthy, Balaji. Managing Coal: A Challenge in Adaptation. Pp. 42.  
  
 There were three reasons why the coal industry underwent consolidation during 
this period. Firstly, in the 1950s, there began a resurgence of demand for coal. This point 
shall be focused upon more intensely. Secondly, labor productivity was increasing in both 
underground and deep-shaft mining. Thirdly, the coal industry, prior to the environmental 
regulation of the 1970s, involved little economic and political risk.  
By 1970, the electrical utility industry was consuming two-thirds of all extracted coal 
(Kitt 266). This contrasted sharply to the 13% that utilities had been demanding in 1946 
(Table III). The increasing demand of the electric utilities was offset by the continually 
falling demand of the railroads that substituted away to diesel fuel (Chakravarthy 37). In 
1946, the railroads were responsible for consuming one-fifth of all coal produced. This 
fell dramatically by 1960 when railroads consumed less than one percent of national coal 
output (Mann 6). 
Table III. 
Electric Utilities’ Demand for Coal 1946-1970 
Year Coal in Thousand Tons 
1946 68,743 
1947 86,009 
1950 88,262 
1955 140,550 
1960 173,882 
10 
 
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje 
1965 242,729 
1970 318,921 
  Gordon, Richard L. Coal in the U.S. Energy Market. Pp. 25. 
As the primary purchasers of coal changed from the railroad industry to the electric utility 
industry, the conditions of the market also changed dramatically. During the 1930s and 
1940s, substantial amounts of coal were sold in the spot market by smaller "truck" mines. 
Production did not require rigorous schedules and quotas. Coal producers could sell coal 
to prospective purchasers at the mine itself or would sell to purchasing agents who would 
transship coal via waterway to other marketplaces. With the advent of the 1950s and 
1960s, these characteristics would quickly vanish as coal output was placed under long-
term contracts to meet the demand of large industrial users. 
Utilities demanded that coal production be reliable and continuous (Chakravarthy 45). 
This was necessary in order to perform on the contracts that had been signed between the 
utilities and the coal companies. The preference for long-term contracts among utilities 
had two important consequences for coal producers. The first of these was the need for 
more labor to insure that coal production reached the amounts needed. This meant hiring 
coal workers who were younger than the average miner and often relatively 
inexperienced. A tightening in the labor market resulted with the expected increases in 
wages (Mann 66). 
The second consequence that long-term contracts had on the coal industry was the need 
for larger reserves (Chakravarthy 51). Utilities would often agree to contract with those 
coal companies that had a supply of reserves well above the amounts specified under the 
desired contract. Because coal reserves could only be estimated and not stated with 
complete accuracy, those companies that enjoyed excess reserves were the preferred 
suppliers and often won the contract. By contracting with a coal producer whose reserves 
were in excess of demand, utilities also hedged against the unfortunate occurrence of a 
producer failing to perform on the contract, wishing instead to sell the committed coal, 
during times of inflation, at spot market prices that were higher than the contract price 
(Mann 76). Having a supply of uncommitted coal allowed the coal producers to meet the 
needs of the utilities and to those profits incurred from higher prices in the spot market. 
Increasing wages and the need for larger coal reserves led to a merger trend in the coal 
industry. The truck mines, numerous in number in Kentucky and the Appalachia, 
gradually disappeared (Kitt 273). They merged into larger companies and were often 
acquired by oil companies wishing to diversify. Merging together allowed the coal 
companies to compete more effectively for long-term contracts. Not only did the size of 
the reserves increase, the acquired companies could also take advantage of the parent 
company’s technical expertise and capital machinery, which were necessary for expanded 
mining operations and distribution.  
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The second reason why consolidation occurred in the coal industry was due to the fact 
that labor productivity had been increasing for several decades prior to 19693 
(Chakravarthy 43-45). This was due to the adoption of labor- and capital-intensive 
technology, which reduced significantly the cost of extracting coal. Labor productivity 
for the coal industry can be seen in Table IV.  
Table IV. 
Labor Productivity in the Coal Industry 
Year Underground Mining Strip Mining 
1960 10.64 22.93 
1965 14.00 31.98 
Chakravarthy, Balaji. Managing Coal: A Challenge in Adaptation. Pp. 43-45.  
Third, the business of coal, prior to the environmental regulation of the 1970s, was 
neither politically nor economically risky (Gordon 320-21). Government policies towards 
coal extraction and production were formulated at the state and local levels. Table V 
illustrates the regulations that governed the coal industry. These regulations cannot be 
described as burdensome on the industry when compared to the far stricter federally 
imposed restrictions suffered by the coal industry of the 1970s. 
Table V. 
State Regulation of Coal Mining 
Procedures to 
Obtain 
Necessary 
Permits 
1. Submission of geological and engineering 
analyses 
2. Submission of plans involving future reclamation 
activities 
3. Written adherence to states’ regulatory powers 
of that industry 
4. Posting of bond which would be returned after 
reclamation activities are concluded 
Enabling 
Legislation 
1. Establishment of state-wide agencies to monitor 
coal operators’ activities 
2. Granting authority to regulators to apply 
regulations to coal mines 
Severance 
Taxation 
Taxes were levied in order to  
1. Compensate the public for the environmental 
damage being done through the operation of coal
12 
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mines 
2. Receive general revenues. 
 Randall, Alan. Resource Economics. Pp. 219-220.  
Economically, coal like other minerals industries, typically performed better than other 
industries. Extractive industries were, and 
still are, less risky than other industries when considering market risk.  
There are three reasons for this. First, market failure for minerals has  
not historically occurred. Second, cyclicality is not a greater concern  
than for any other industry. Third, fluctuations are less severe for this  
industry than for others (Gordon 320). 
Section VI. Benefits of Acquisition. 
The horizontal mergers of United Electric and Freeman Coal with Material Services were 
symbolic of an overall trend in the coal industry (Schwartz 190). Throughout the nation, 
smaller firms were combining to become larger firms. The most typical form of merger 
was between an oil company and a coal company (Chakravarthy 51). This allowed the 
former to diversify into other areas of the energy industry; the latter benefited by having 
access to the enormous financial resources of their parent oil company.  
 Freeman and United, however, did not complement one another in terms of 
production processes and managerial skills. Freeman Coal was engaged in deep-shaft 
mining. Deep-shaft mining is capital intensive in nature and employs large amounts of 
machinery for several decades. United Electric was strip-mining coal. Strip-mining is 
relatively more labor-intensive than deep-shaft. The machinery needed to carry out these 
two general forms of extraction differs tremendously. To operate these mines requires 
managers whose abilities were not translatable from one type of mining operation to 
another (Moyer 9).  
 The two subsidiaries did complement one another in an interesting way. As 
mentioned above, utilities preferred to contract with those companies whose reserves 
were in excess of the amount specified in the contract. United’s reserves had been 
diminishing throughout the 1960s (Posner 432). This caused United to experience 
difficulty in obtaining long-term contracts. When the two companies were brought under 
Material Services’ leadership, a portion of Freeman’s reserves was allocated to guarantee 
United’s commitments. Thus, through association with Material Services (and, therefore, 
with Freeman Coal), the marketability of United’s coal was strengthened, increasing that 
firm’s ability to compete for long-term contracts, though only in the short-term.  
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 Another benefit can be seen in regards to Freeman Coal. When Freeman was an 
independent company, that firm had limited access to the many utility firms operating in 
the Midwest. The range of Freeman’s actual and potential customers was within a 
relatively limited range inside of the Eastern Interior Coal Province. Exporting coal 
outside of this region was extraordinarily expensive. Freeman and United were not direct 
competitors in regards to the many consumers of coal.  
 Ultimately, when General Dynamics acquired control over Freeman Coal (via 
Material Services), the ability of Freeman to supply a growing number of coal consumers 
increased demonstrably. The flow of ownership away from Freeman to Material Services 
and, then, to General Dynamics had a profound impact on the ability of that firm to 
service new clients. This is particularly true in regards to Edison Utilities in the Midwest. 
Table VI illustrates the impact that acquisition had on Freeman Coal. 
  
  
 Table VI. 
Benefits of Acquisition Over Time 
Flow of Ownership  
Of Freeman Coal 
Freeman’s Status 
of Ownership 
Freeman’s 
Ability to 
Service 
Commonwealth 
Edison 
Utilities 
Freeman Coal  
  
  
  
Material Services 
  
  
  
  
Freeman is an 
independent firm prior 
to Material Service’s 
stock purchases. 
Freeman is informally 
controlled by Material 
Services by 1964.  
  
  
  
  
A majority of Freeman’s 
stock is bought by 
General Dynamics in 
1969.  
  
Freeman was prevented from 
entering certain markets due 
to transportation costs. 
Entry into new markets for 
the sale of coal was 
rendered feasible by lowered 
transportation costs made 
available through 
association with Material 
Services.  
Further association of 
Freeman Coal and Common- 
wealth Edison, and other 
utilities, on a supplier/ 
purchaser basis, proceeds. 
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General Dynamics 
  
To help us summarize this section, we shall construct a Material Capacity (MATCAP) 
appraisal of United Electric and Freeman Coal. Such an appraisal involves an 
understanding of both firms in terms of their reserves and their access to finance. Both 
firms faced different levels of 
reserves. United, during the 1970s was depleting its reserves and was 
unsuccessfully attempting to uncover new ones. Freeman, on the other  
hand, still maintained large amounts of reserves and was not in any danger of exhausting 
its mines.  
As for access to capital resources, any firm, essentially, has three methods of raising the 
capital needed to expand operations and to replace aging capital. Firms can raise capital 
through equity, bonds, or allocating internal funds (of the firm itself). Even though the 
coal industry was especially lucrative and investors were willing to risk their monies, coal 
companies were burdened by increasing interest rates throughout the 1960s. This burden, 
though not as severe as was witnessed in the 1970s, decreased the firms’ willingness to 
look for capital outside the firm. Financially rich oil companies proved a wonderful 
opportunity for many coal companies, many of whom welcomed conglomerate mergers 
with the former. United and Freeman had access to the tremendous financial resources of 
General Dynamics. This decreased the level of uncertainty regarding future sources of 
financing. Based upon the information in the preceding two paragraphs, we can generate 
our MATCAP which is shown in the table below.  
Table VII. 
MATCAP Analysis of Freeman and United  
After Acquisition in 1964 
  Reserves Financial Resources 
  Deep-
Shaft 
Strip Mining   
15 
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United Electric Low Medium Abundant 
        
Freeman Coal Abundant Low Abundant 
 This table illustrates the precarious condition that United Electric was in even 
after that firm’s acquisition by General Dynamics. United had been unable to find any 
additional reserves, while, at the same time, the useful life of that company’s strip-mines 
was decreasing precipitously. The MATCAP appraisal also compares United Electric to 
Freeman Coal, who enjoyed far greater reserves and whose potential to generate revenues 
was far greater, in the long-term, than United Electric.  
The previous two sections have attempted to demonstrate that a) the combination of 
United and Freeman was a reflection of an ongoing merger dynamic in the coal industry, 
and b) the acquisition of those firms generated economic efficiencies. Only by combining 
to form a united company could United Electric receive tremendous access to financial 
resources to search for additional coal. As for Freeman Coal, that company benefited 
from acquisition by having the market for that company’s coal be widened significantly. 
The Court’s observance of these economic efficiencies makes General Dynamics a 
landmark case in the history of antitrust.  
Section VII. The Court’s Response and the Legacy of General  Dynamics  
 The Supreme Court maintained that the relevant product market had inadequately 
been defined by the DOJ. The product market broadened substantially when the Court 
allowed other fuels such as oil and natural gas to be included. The Court also refused the 
DOJ’s notion that United Electric would, at some future date, procure additional reserves, 
by which that firm would increase market power in the EICP. The Court’s rejection of 
these two pillars of the DOJ’s case severely weakened the legitimacy of the DOJ’s 
arguments.  
The significance of General Dynamics, however, does not rest in the successful rebuttals 
of the DOJ’s ill-founded assumptions. The landmark decision that was handed down in 
General Dynamics dealt primarily with the issue of how should a firm be judged when 
that firm has substantial amounts of its production committed under long-term contracts. 
Also, of equal importance is how should a firm be judged when that firm faces 
diminishing levels of extractable resources. Considering both of these factors weakens 
the market power and raises the legality of any merger among such firms, because the 
firm’s (post-merger) contribution to concentration within the market is insignificant.  
General Dynamics, in association with other cases brought before the courts, contributed 
to a changing attitude towards the benefits of merger activity. The defendants involved in 
FTC v National Tea Co. (1979) and U.S. v International Harvest Co. (1977) have 
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maintained that market shares should be dropped entirely from the Court’s consideration 
(Turner 1155). 
By the 1980s, the move away from strict per se findings towards rulings based on a rule 
of reason dominated the courts. Despite the DOJ’s retention of concentration analysis in 
their 1982-84 Guidelines, the importance of such analysis had decreased precipitously 
(Walters 224). The public statements of the Reagan Administration further reflected the 
more amicable environment towards business (Waldman 124). 
This paper has examined the Government’s case against General Dynamics. The errors in 
defining the relevant geographic and product markets and their influence on calculating 
market concentration have been observed. Also, the paper has provided an overview of 
the investigation typical of functional analysis. This paper concludes by demonstrating 
the durable effects of the General Dynamics decision on subsequent cases, 
Further areas for research include an analysis of the effects General Dynamics has had on 
antitrust law as well as antitrust theory; the development of new methods to delineate 
geographic and product markets; the applicability of General Dynamics in current and 
future court cases; and types of defenses that have been used to refute market share 
standards. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Notes: 
1: The Eastern Interior Coal Province (EICP) is cluster of states in the  Midwest that 
are involved in the extraction and the production of  coal. These states include Illinois, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana,  Tennessee, Iowa, and Wisconsin.   
2. During the latter portion of the 1960s and 1970s, the coal unions  became more 
vocal and demanding both at the negotiating level and  at the political level. The 
unions successfully lobbied the federal  government for the passage of the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and  Safety Act. Throughout the 1970s, the unions won large 
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wage  increases from the coal companies for those workers primarily  engaged in the 
far riskier extraction of underground reserves.   
3: In 1969, the Federal Government, alarmed at the growing number of  fatalities in 
deep-shaft mines, passed the Federal Coal Mine Health  and Safety Act. This Act 
demanded that firms take precautions by  doing the following: 1) increased roof 
bolting; 2) ventilation; and  3) rock dusting. The Act had two effects on the coal 
industry.  Firstly, the Act created a new federal bureaucracy that hired many 
 persons then employed with coal companies. The technical abilities  of 
these individuals were difficult for the coal companies to  replace. Thus, the coal 
industry witnessed a slight tightening in the  labor markets. Secondly, labor productivity 
of underground mining  suffered severe losses in part due to meeting the 
requirements of the  1969 Act. Labor productivity fell throughout the 1970s from 13.76 
 in 1970 to 8.5 in 1975.  
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